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ASYMPTOTIC EFFICIENCY OF THE PROPORTIONAL
COMPENSATION SCHEME FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF PRODUCERS
DMITRY B. ROKHLIN AND ANATOLY USOV
Abstract. We consider a manager, who allocates some fixed total payment amount be-
tween N rational agents in order to maximize the aggregate production. The profit of i-th
agent is the difference between the compensation (reward) obtained from the manager and
the production cost. We compare (i) the normative compensation scheme, where the man-
ager enforces the agents to follow an optimal cooperative strategy; (ii) the linear piece rates
compensation scheme, where the manager announces an optimal reward per unit good; (iii)
the proportional compensation scheme, where agent’s reward is proportional to his contri-
bution to the total output. Denoting the correspondent total production levels by s∗, sˆ and
s respectively, where the last one is related to the unique Nash equilibrium, we examine the
limits of the prices of anarchy AN = s
∗/s, A ′
N
= sˆ/s as N →∞. These limits are calculated
for the cases of identical convex costs with power asymptotics at the origin, and for power
costs, corresponding to the Coob-Douglas and generalized CES production functions with
decreasing returns to scale. Our results show that asymptotically no performance is lost in
terms of A ′
N
, and in terms of AN the loss does not exceed 31%.
1. Introduction
Consider a manager, who allocates some fixed some fixed total payment amount M be-
tween N producers (agents) in order to maximize the aggregate production. The profit of
each agent equals to the difference between the reward obtained from the manager and the
production cost ϕi. If the cost functions are known, the manager can determine rewards,
stimulating the optimal aggregate production s∗. We call such compensation scheme nor-
mative. Besides the quite unrealistic assumption that the cost functions are known, this
scheme suffers from another drawback: it does not announce any common reward sharing
rules. However, s∗ can serve as a benchmark.
Another idea is to use the linear piece rates compensation scheme, announcing a price
µ of the unit good. So, the reward µxi of i-th agent will be linear in his production level
xi. Assuming an individually optimal (rational) agent behaviour, the manager can chose µ
in such a way that the total reward does not exceed M , and the total production sˆ cannot
be improved by another linear reward rule. Clearly, this compensation scheme also requires
the knowledge of production cost functions, although it is easier to assign one parameter
µ, rather than the full set of rewards, as in the normative scheme. Note also that in the
piece rates allocation scheme the total reward requested by irrational agents can exceed M .
Nevertheless, we regard the value sˆ as another benchmark.
The main focus of the present study is the proportional compensation scheme, where the
reward Mxi/(x1+ · · ·+xN) of i-th agent is proportional to his contribution to the aggregate
production. The realization of this scheme requires no information concerning the cost
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functions, and the total reward equals to M irrespective of agent actions (except the trivial
case, where x = 0). So, the manager allows the agents to determine optimal production
levels on their own in the course of a (non-cooperative) game with the payoff functions
M
xi
x1 + · · ·+ xN
− ϕi(xi). (1.1)
Under the assumption that the cost functions ϕi are convex and strictly increasing, the game
(1.1) has a unique Nash equilibrium. By s we denote the correspondent total production.
One may argue that the computation of a Nash equilibrium also requires the knowledge
of cost functions. However, such equilibrium also can emerge as a result of agent interaction
in a repeated game through the mechanism of no-regret learning. We recall this concept at
the end of the paper. For each agent the no-regret learning does not require the knowledge
of the cost functions of other agents.
The game (1.1) is a special case of the Cournot oligopoly: [27, 25], and it fits into the
extensively studied theory of contests : see [7, 21, 8, 32] for reviews (an experimental research
is reviewed in [12]). In a contest the payoff function of each player is the difference between
the contest success function (CSF) and the cost of player’s effort. A player’s CSF usually
equals to the expected value of winning an indivisible prize, or, as in our case, to the portion
of the prize, obtained by the player. It depends on the efforts of all players, and it is
increasing in the effort of a selected player and decreasing in the efforts of the other ones.
An account of the CSF’s can be found in [18].
Using the substitution fi(yi) = ϕ
−1
i (yi), we can reduce the game (1.1) to a strategically
equivalent contest
M
fi(yi)
f1(y1) + · · ·+ fN(yN)
− yi (1.2)
with the CSF of the general-logit form (in the terminology of [32, Chapter 4]). In addition,
in our main example of power costs ϕi = cix
α
i , α ≥ 1, corresponding to generalized CES
production functions with decreasing returns to scale, the game (1.2) boils down to the
Tullock contest with fi(yi) = (yi/ci)
1/α.
Contests are used to model conflict situations in rent-seeking, resource allocation, patent
races, sports, advertising, etc. The present paper is related to the analysis of relative perfor-
mance incentive schemes in labour contracts. An active study of such problems was initiated
in 1980s: [23, 14, 26, 24]. We also mention several recent papers with an emphasis on ex-
perimental and empirical studies: [6, 15, 29], where the reader can find a lot of additional
references. The prevailing concept is the rank-order allocation of prizes (rank-order tourna-
ments). However, the proportional prize-contest was promoted by the means of experimental
studies in [3].
The main feature of the present paper is the analysis of the following two versions of the
“price of anarchy”: AN = s
∗/s, A ′N = sˆ/s for a large number N of agents. In line with [22]
the price of anarchy shows how much performance is lost by the lack of coordination. The
study of the prices of anarchy recently became an active area of research. We mention only
a few papers, studying an efficiency of the proportional resource allocation mechanism in
somewhat different models: [19, 5, 2].
In Section 2 we describe three compensation schemes mentioned above. In particular, we
point out that any contest scheme cannot be better than the normative one (Remark 2). In
Section 3 we study the prices of anarchy AN , A
′
N for large N . Our results show that for the
cases of identical convex costs ϕi = ϕ with power asymptotics at the origin (Theorem 1), and
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for heterogeneous agents with power costs ϕi(x) = cix
α, α > 1 (Theorem 2), asymptotically
no performance is lost in terms of A ′N , and in terms of AN the loss does not exceed 31%.
These results characterize an asymptotic efficiency of the proportional compensation scheme.
We also conjecture that this result remains true for heterogeneous agents with linear cost
functions (α = 1) and i.i.d. marginal costs ci.
2. Three compensation schemes
Let xi be the amount of good produced by i-th agent. Denote by ϕi : R+ 7→ R+ the related
production cost. We assume that the functions ϕi are twice continuously differentiable,
ϕi(0) = 0, ϕ
′
i(xi) > 0, ϕ
′′
i (xi) ≥ 0, xi > 0. It easily follows that ϕi(xi)→ +∞, xi → +∞.
(i) Normative compensation scheme. Agent i knows the reward function ψi(xi) ≥ 0 at the
beginning of the production cycle and maximizes his profit:
ψi(xi)− ϕ(xi)→ max
xi≥0
. (2.1)
Let ψi(0) = 0, and denote by x˜i = x˜i(ψi) optimal solutions of (2.1), which for simplicity we
assume to exist. The manager has M units of capital at his disposal. His aim is to maximize
the total production:
N∑
i=1
x˜i → max
over all reward functions ψi, satisfying the conditions
N∑
i=1
ψi(x˜i) ≤M ; ψi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N.
Since ψi(x˜i)− ϕi(x˜i) ≥ 0, we get the estimate
N∑
i=1
ϕi(x˜i) ≤
N∑
i=1
ψi(x˜i) ≤M.
Thus, given the budget M , the total production cannot exceed the value
s∗ = sup
{
N∑
i=1
xi :
N∑
i=1
ϕi(xi) ≤M, x ≥ 0
}
(2.2)
for any kind of rewards ψi.
On the other hand, it is possible to obtain the total production arbitrary close to s∗ by
announcing the rewards
ψi(xi) = ϕi(x
∗
i )I[x∗i−εi,∞)(xi), (2.3)
where x∗ = (x∗i )
N
i=1 is an optimal solution of (2.2) and
εi ∈ (0, x
∗
i ), if x
∗
i > 0; εi = 0, if x
∗
i = 0.
Indeed, in this case the optimal solution of (2.1) is of the form
x˜i =
{
x∗i − εi, x
∗
i > 0,
0, x∗i = 0
and
∑N
i=1 x˜i = s
∗−
∑N
i=1 εi, while
∑N
i=1 ψi(x˜i) =
∑N
i=1 ϕi(x
∗
i ) ≤ M. Thus, one can regard s
∗
as the optimal total production amount under the normative compensation scheme.
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(ii) Linear piece rates compensation scheme. Assume that the cost functions are strictly
convex and the manager tries to choose a best linear reward function ψi(xi) = µxi. The
production levels xˆi(µ) are determined by the problems
µxi − ϕi(xi)→ max
xi≥0
. (2.4)
The functions xˆi(µ) are non-decreasing, and the best choice of µ corresponds to the largest
total production which does not violate the budget constraint:
µ
N∑
i=1
xˆi =M. (2.5)
The aggregate production is given by sˆ =
∑N
i=1 xˆi.
(iii) Proportional compensation scheme. The left-hand side of (2.5) equals to the total
reward. If the agents anticipate that the manager selects µ in this way, then they become
involved in the non-cooperative game with the payoff functions
Hi(x) =M
xi∑N
i=j xj
− ϕi(xi), x ≥ 0 (2.6)
with the convention 0/0 = 0. The total production equals to
s =
N∑
i=1
xi,
where x is the unique Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the game (2.6):
Hi(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xN) ≥ Hi(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xN), j = 1, . . . , N, xi ≥ 0.
The existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (for N ≥ 2) was proved in [30]. The
proof was simplified in [9], see also [10] for an exposition.
It is easy to see that x has at least two positive components. Furthermore, for such x
the functions xi 7→ Hi(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xN) are (strictly) concave. An elementary analysis of
the correspondent one-dimensional problems shows that x is characterized by the following
relations
ϕ′i(xi) =M
s− xi
s2
, if ϕ′i(0) <
M
s
, (2.7)
xi = 0, if ϕ
′
i(0) ≥
M
s
, (2.8)
s =
N∑
j=1
xj. (2.9)
Following [30], note that for s > 0 the relations
s2ϕ′i(zi) =M(s− zi), sϕ
′
i(0) < M, (2.10)
zi(s) = 0, sϕ
′
i(0) ≥M
uniquely define continuous functions zi(s). Clearly, x is a Nash equilibrium iff x = z(s),
where s is a solution of the equation
N∑
i=1
zi(s) = s, s > 0. (2.11)
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Following [9, 10] let us pass from the replacement functions zi to the share functions
σi(s) = zi(s)/s. The existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium follow from (2.11) in
view of the properties of the share functions (see [10, Proposition 2]): σi are continuous,
strictly decreasing where positive,
lim
s→0
σi(s) = 1, lim
s→∞
σi(s) = 0.
So, the equation
N∑
i=1
σi(s) = 1, s > 0, (2.12)
which is equivalent to (2.11), has a unique solution.
Remark 1. Introducing the game (2.6), we followed the reasoning of [19]. In their model
(inspired by [20]), the users share a communication link of some given capacity. The link
manager gets payments (bids) from the users and allocates the rates according to the an-
nounced price. The manager adjusts the price in order to allocate the entire link capacity.
If the users are price takers, then the model is referred to as a competitive equilibrium. If
they are price-anticipating, then they are involved in a game, and it is assumed that their
bids correspond to a Nash equilibrium.
The reward functions (2.3), in fact, only tell the agents the production levels x∗i − εi,
specified for them by the manager. This normative scheme is quite sensible to individual
cost functions ϕi. Moreover, it does not announce any common compensation rules. All these
drawbacks force to seek for more reliable compensation schemes. The following discussion
shows that this task is not trivial.
We see that (2.2) is a solvable convex optimization problem, satisfying the Slater condition.
Hence, x∗ ≥ 0 is an optimal solution of (2.2) iff there exists λ∗ ≥ 0 such that
λ∗ϕ′j(x
∗
j) = 1, if x
∗
j > 0; λ
∗ϕ′j(0) ≥ 1, if x
∗
j = 0; (2.13)
λ∗
(
N∑
i=1
ϕi(x
∗
i )−M
)
= 0,
N∑
i=1
ϕi(x
∗
i ) ≤M.
Equivalently, x∗ ≥ 0 is an optimal solution of (2.2) iff there exists λ∗ > 0 such that (2.13)
and the equality
N∑
i=1
ϕi(x
∗
i ) =M (2.14)
hold true. Furthermore, for given λ∗ > 0 a point x∗ ≥ 0 satisfies (2.13) iff each x∗i is an
optimal solution of the problem
xi/λ
∗ − ϕi(xi)→ max
xi≥0
(2.15)
similar to (2.4). Assume for a moment that ϕi are strictly convex. Then (2.14) implies that
x∗ is unique and λ∗ is also uniquely defined by (2.13), since at least one component of x∗ is
positive.
It is tempting to try ψi(xi) = xi/λ
∗ for the role of reward functions. Indeed, by (2.15),
they stimulate optimal production levels x∗i . However, in contrast to the piece rate scheme,
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ψi(xi) = xi/λ
∗ are not legal reward functions, since x∗i /λ
∗ − ϕi(x
∗
i ) > 0 for x
∗
i > 0, and the
total reward exceeds the budget M :
N∑
i=1
ψi(x
∗
i ) =
1
λ∗
N∑
i=1
x∗i >
N∑
i=1
ϕi(x
∗
i ) =M.
Note, that the substitution xi = ϕ
−1
i (yi) reduces (2.2) to the following equivalent problem:
sup
{
N∑
i=1
Ui(yi) :
N∑
i=1
yi ≤ M, y ≥ 0
}
, (2.16)
where Ui(yi) = ϕ
−1
i (yi) are strictly increasing concave functions. This is a customary non-
linear resource allocation problem: see, e.g., [28]. If the functions Ui are strictly concave,
then, similarly to the above discussion, there is a unique pair (y∗, µ∗) with y∗ ≥ 0, µ∗ > 0,
satisfying the optimality conditions
U ′i(y
∗
i ) = µ
∗, if y∗i > 0; U
′
i(0) ≤ µ
∗, if y∗i = 0;
N∑
i=1
y∗i =M.
It follows that the unique optimal solution y∗ of (2.16) can be recovered from the one-
dimensional optimization problems
Ui(yi)− µ
∗yi → max
yi≥0
. (2.17)
Thus, by selling the resource at price µ∗ (per unit), the manager can stimulate the optimal
plan y∗. But in the present context yi = ϕi(xi) correspond to production costs, so the
optimization problems (2.17) make no economic sense.
Remark 2. Closing this section, we will show that any contest scheme cannot produce
better result than (2.2). Consider a non-cooperative game between N agents with the payoff
functions
Hi(x) = Ψi(x1, . . . , xN )− ϕi(x), x ≥ 0,
where Ψi ≥ 0 is the reward of i-th agent, and Ψi(0) = 0. Let a random vector (ξ1, . . . , ξN) ≥ 0
be a Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies):
E(Ψi(ξ1, . . . , ξn)− ϕi(ξi)) ≥ E(Ψi(ξ1, . . . , ξi, . . . , ξn)− ϕi(ξi)), ξi ≥ 0.
We implicitly assume that all expectations exist. Putting ξi = 0, we infer that
E(Ψi(ξ1, . . . , ξn)− ϕi(ξi)) ≥ 0.
If the total reward on average does not exceed M :
∑N
i=1 EΨi(ξ1, . . . , ξn) ≤M , then
N∑
i=1
Eϕi(ξi) ≤M.
A fortiori,
∑N
i=1 ϕi(Eξi) ≤ M by the Jensen inequality, and from the definition (2.2) of s
∗ it
follows that
N∑
i=1
Eξi ≤ s
∗.
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This negative result is by no means an indication that contest compensation schemes are
useless. The point is that the organization of a contest may not require the knowledge of
production cost functions ϕi.
3. The prices of anarchy in case of a large number of producers
In this paper we are interested in the behaviour of the following two versions of the “price
of anarchy”:
AN = s
∗/s, A ′N = sˆ/s
for a large number N of agents. Recall, that the quantities s∗, sˆ, s describe three types of
the aggregate production:
(i) s∗ corresponds to an optimal cooperative strategy, enforced by the reward functions
(2.3): see (2.2) (the normative compensation scheme);
(ii) sˆ is related to the case of “reward-taking” agents: see (2.4), (2.5), where the “best”
common linear reward function is announced by the manager (the linear piece rates
compensation scheme);
(iii) s corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the game (2.6) for “reward-anticipating”
agents (the proportional compensation scheme).
We will refer to the related problems as (i), (ii) and (iii).
The case of identical cost functions is considered in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume that ϕi = ϕ and
ϕ(y) ∼ cyα, ϕ′(y) ∼ αcyα−1, y → +0; c > 0, α ≥ 1. (3.1)
Then
lim
N→∞
AN = α
1/α, lim
N→∞
A
′
N = 1.
Proof. (i) As it was mentioned in Section 2, a vector x∗ is an optimal solution of (2.2) iff it
satisfies (2.14), and there exists λ∗ ≥ 0, satisfying (2.13). It is natural to seek a solution of
the (2.13), (2.14) in the symmetric form: x∗i = y
∗ > 0, i = 1, . . . , N . We have
λ∗ϕ′(y∗) = 1, λ∗ ≥ 0; Nϕ(y∗) =M. (3.2)
Clearly, such a pair (y∗, λ∗) exists. From the second equality (3.2) it follows that y∗ → 0,
N →∞, and using the first condition (3.1), we get
y∗ ∼
(
M
cN
)1/α
, s∗ = Ny∗ ∼
(
M
c
)1/α
N (α−1)/α, N →∞. (3.3)
(ii) From (2.4), (2.5) we see that xˆi are identical: xˆi(µ) = yˆ, and
ϕ′(yˆ) = µ, Nµyˆ =M. (3.4)
Using (3.4) and (3.1), we conclude that yˆ → 0, N →∞ and
µyˆ =
M
N
= yˆϕ′(yˆ) ∼ αcyˆα; yˆ ∼
(
M
αcN
)1/α
,
sˆ = Nyˆ ∼
(
M
αc
)1/α
N (α−1)/α, N →∞. (3.5)
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(iii) We look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium of (2.6): xi = y > 0, i = 1, . . . , N . From
(2.7), (2.9) we get
ϕ′(y) =M
N − 1
N2y
.
Hence, y → 0, N →∞ and
M
N − 1
N2
= yϕ′(y) ∼ αcyα; y ∼
(
M
αcN
)1/α
,
s = Ny ∼
(
M
cα
)1/α
N (α−1)/α, N →∞. (3.6)
The assertion of the theorem follows from the asymptotic forms (3.3), (3.5), (3.6). 
Assume that the agents use the same technology, but obtain resources at different prices.
This situation is natural if the firm has departments in various locations. In this case the
resource prices may depend on the quality of transportation network, the cost of labour,
etc., in a concrete location. Denote by (r1, . . . , rm) the resource amounts (inputs), and
by (pi1, . . . , p
i
m) their prices in i-th location. For the production function F (r1, . . . , rm) the
production cost function is defined by
ϕi(x) = inf
{
m∑
j=1
pijrj : F (r1, . . . , rm) ≥ x, r ≥ 0
}
.
For the Cobb-Douglas production function F (r) = A
∏m
j=1 r
βj
j , A > 0, βj > 0 by the
Lagrange duality (see, e.g., [1]) we have:
ϕi(x) = inf
{
m∑
j=1
pijrj :
m∑
j=1
βj ln rj ≥ ln(x/A), r ≥ 0
}
= sup
λ≥0
θi(λ),
where ln 0 = −∞ and
θi(λ) = inf
r≥0
{
m∑
j=1
pijrj + λ
(
ln(x/A)−
m∑
j=1
βj ln rj
)}
= λ ln(x/A) +
m∑
j=1
inf
rj≥0
{pijrj − λβj ln rj}
= λ ln(x/A) +
m∑
j=1
(
λβj − λβj ln
λβj
pij
)
.
An elementary calculation shows that
ϕi(x) = sup
λ≥0
θi(λ) = cix
α, α =
1∑m
j=1 βj
, ci =
1
αAα
(
m∏
j=1
(
pij
βj
)βj)α
.
Similarly, for the generalized CES production function (see, e.g., [4, 31]):
F (r) = A
(
m∑
j=1
aρjr
ρ
j
)γ/ρ
, A, aj, γ > 0, ρ ∈ (0, 1)
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we have
ϕi(x) = inf
{
m∑
j=1
pijrj :
m∑
j=1
aρjr
ρ
j ≥
( x
A
)ρ/γ
, r ≥ 0
}
= sup
λ≥0
θi(λ),
where
θi(λ) = inf
r≥0
{
m∑
j=1
pijrj + λ
(( x
A
)ρ/γ
−
m∑
j=1
aρjr
ρ
j
)}
= λ
( x
A
)ρ/γ
+
m∑
j=1
inf
rj≥0
{pijrj − λa
ρ
jr
ρ
j}
= λ
( x
A
)ρ/γ
− (1− ρ)
m∑
j=1
(
ajρ
pij
)ρ/(1−ρ)
λ1/(1−ρ).
Maximizing this expression over λ ≥ 0, we get
ϕi(x) = cix
1/γ , ci =
1
A1/γ
(
m∑
j=1
(
aj
pij
)ρ/(1−ρ))−(1−ρ)/ρ
.
Thus, the Cobb-Douglas and generalized CES production functions with decreasing re-
turns to scale (that is, with
∑m
j=1 βj ≤ 1 and γ ≤ 1 respectively) correspond to power cost
functions: ϕi(x) = cix
α, α ≥ 1. Certainly, this fact is known (see [11, Chapter 5]), and we
only recalled it here.
Now we have enough economic motivation to consider a model, representing heterogeneous
agents by power cost functions with common exponent and different multiplication constants.
Theorem 2. Assume that ϕi(x) = cix
α, α > 1, ci > 0 and
lim
N→∞
N∑
i=1
(
min1≤k≤N ck
ci
)1/(α−1)
=∞. (3.7)
Then
lim
N→∞
AN = α
1/α, lim
N→∞
A
′
N = 1. (3.8)
Proof. (i) By the Lagrange duality the value of the problem (2.2) can be represented as
follows:
s∗ = − inf
{
−
N∑
i=1
xi :
N∑
i=1
cix
α
i ≤M, x ≥ 0
}
= − sup
λ≥0
θ(λ),
θ(λ) = inf
x≥0
{
−
N∑
i=1
xi + λ
(
N∑
i=1
cix
α
i −M
)}
= −Mλ +
N∑
i=1
inf
xi≥0
(−xi + λcix
α
i )
= −Mλ −Bλ−
1
α−1 , B = (α− 1)
(
1
α
) α
α−1
N∑
i=1
(
1
ci
) 1
α−1
.
Maximizing this expression over λ ≥ 0, we get
s∗ =M1/α
(
N∑
i=1
1
c
1/(α−1)
i
)(α−1)/α
. (3.9)
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(ii) The optimization problems (2.4) take the form
µxi − cix
α
i → max
xi≥0
.
Substituting their optimal solutions xˆi = (µ/(ciα))
1/(α−1) in (2.5), we get
µ = α1/α
(
M∑N
i=1 c
−1/(α−1)
i
)(α−1)/α
.
Hence,
sˆ =
N∑
i=1
xˆi =
(µ
α
)1/(α−1) N∑
i=1
1
c
1/(α−1)
i
=
(
M
α
)1/α( N∑
j=1
1
c
1/(α−1)
j
)(α−1)/α
(3.10)
Comparing with (3.9), we see that sˆ = s∗/α1/α.
(iii) To analyse the proportional compensation scheme consider the equations (2.10),
(2.11):
χi(s, zi) = s
2αciz
α−1
i −Ms +Mzi = 0, (3.11)
χ(s, z) =
N∑
i=1
zi − s = 0.
For
zˆi(s) =
(
M
αcis
)1/(α−1)
, K ∈ (0, 1) (3.12)
we have χi(s, zˆi(s)) =Mzˆi(s) > 0 and
χi(s,Kzˆi(s)) =M(K
α−1 − 1)s+MKzˆi(s) < 0, for s > si,
si =
(
K
1−Kα−1
)(α−1)/α (
M
αci
)1/α
.
A function χi is strictly increasing in zi. Hence, the solution zi(s) of (3.11) satisfies the
inequalities
Kzˆi(s) < zi(s) < zˆi(s), s > si. (3.13)
Put
g(s) = K
N∑
i=1
zˆi(s)− s, χ(s) =
N∑
i=1
zi(s)− s, h(s) =
N∑
i=1
zˆi(s)− s.
From (3.13) we get
g(s) < χ(s) < h(s), s > max
1≤i≤N
si.
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For, sˆ given by (3.10), we have
h(sˆ) =
N∑
i=1
(
M
αcisˆ
)1/(α−1)
− sˆ
=
1
sˆ1/(α−1)
((
M
α
)1/(α−1) N∑
i=1
1
c
1/(α−1)
i
− sˆα/(α−1)
)
= 0;
g(K(α−1)/αsˆ) = K
N∑
i=1
zˆi(K
(α−1)/αsˆ)−K(α−1)/αsˆ
= K(α−1)/α
(
N∑
i=1
zˆi(sˆ)− sˆ
)
= 0.
It follows that
χ(K(α−1)/αsˆ) > 0, χ(sˆ) < 0, (3.14)
if K(α−1)/αsˆ > max1≤i≤N si. The last inequality reduces to
N∑
j=1
(
min1≤i≤N ci
cj
)1/(α−1)
≥
1
1−Kα−1
. (3.15)
For anyK ∈ (0, 1), by virtue of (3.7), the inequality (3.15), and, consequently, the inequalities
(3.14), hold true for N large enough.
From (3.14) it follows that the unique solution s of (2.11), or, equivalently, of (2.12),
satisfies the inequalities
K(α−1)/αsˆ < s < sˆ (3.16)
for sufficiently large N , as far as χ(s)/s =
∑N
i=1 σi(s) − 1, and the share functions σi are
strictly decreasing. Since K ∈ (0, 1) is arbitrary, we conclude that
s ∼ sˆ, N →∞. (3.17)
The assertion of the theorem follows from the relations (3.9), (3.10), (3.17). 
The limits (3.8) are similar to those of Theorem 1. Note that
lim
N→∞
AN = α
1/α ≤ e1/e ≈ 1.445, α > 1.
So, the asymptotic efficiency loss of the proportional compensation scheme, compared to the
normative one, does not exceed 31%.
Remark 3. In any compensation scheme under the assumption (3.7) the total production
tends to +∞ as N → ∞. The same is true in the setting of Theorem 1 for α > 1. This is
a consequence of the fact that the agent expenditures are very small for small amounts of
output. In other words, they can start production almost for free. By hiring a large number
of such agents the manager can ensure an arbitrary large output.
Remark 4. The total cost to total premium ratio
DN =
1
M
N∑
i=1
ciz
α
i (s)
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can be regarded as a measure of the reward dissipation of the proportional compensation
scheme. For the normative scheme this ratio always equals to 1: see (2.14). The estimates
(3.13), (3.16) imply that
Kzˆi(sˆ) < Kzˆi(s) < zi(s) < zˆi(s) < zˆi(K
(α−1)/αsˆ),
Kα
N∑
i=1
cizˆ
α
i (sˆ) <
N∑
i=1
ciz
α
i (s) <
N∑
i=1
cizˆ
α
i (K
(α−1)/αsˆ)
for sufficiently large N . After the substitution of (3.12), (3.10) we get
M
α
Kα = Kα
N∑
i=1
ci
(
M
αcisˆ
)α/(α−1)
<
N∑
i=1
ciz
α
i (s)
<
1
K
N∑
i=1
ci
(
M
αcisˆ
)α/(α−1)
=
M
αK
.
Since K ∈ (0, 1) is arbitrary, it follows that
lim
N→∞
DN = 1/α > 1.
Thus, the reward does not completely dissipate in the limit. This fact is also a consequence
of the inequality DN ≤ (N − 1)/(Nα), obtained in [9, Theorem 5].
The condition (3.7) is satisfied if the sequence ci is non-decreasing and
∞∑
i=1
1
c
1/(α−1)
i
= +∞.
It is not satisfied for c
1/(α−1)
i = cq
i−1, c > 0, q > 0, q 6= 1.
Remark 5. Assume that ci are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables,
bounded from below by a positive constant: ci ≥ c > 0. Then the condition (3.7) is satisfied
almost surely:
N∑
i=1
(
min1≤k≤N ck
ci
)1/(α−1)
≥ c1/(α−1)
N∑
i=1
(
1
ci
)1/(α−1)
→∞ a.s., N →∞.
Indeed, consider a sequence of strictly positive i.i.d. random variables ξi and take a constant
L > 0 such that ν = E(ξi ∧ L) > 0, where a ∧ b = min{a, b}. By the strong law of large
numbers we have
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξi ≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξi ∧ L = ν a.s.
Hence,
∑∞
i=1 ξi ≥
∑∞
i=1 ξi ∧ L = +∞.
The case of linear cost functions ϕi(x) = cix appears to be more complex from the asymp-
totical point of view, although there is known an explicit expression for s in this case: see
[17, Proposition 5]. For reader’s convenience, in the next theorem we derive this expression
using the argumentation similar to [32, Theorem 4.19]. We only consider the price of anarchy
AN , since from (2.4), (2.5) we see that µ = max1≤i≤N ci, and in this case optimal production
levels xˆi of reward-taking agents either equal to zero or are not uniquely defined.
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Theorem 3. Assume that ϕi(x) = cix, 0 < c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cN . Then
AN =
1
l − 1
l∑
i=1
ci
c1
, (3.18)
l = min{i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1} :
1
i− 1
i∑
k=1
ck ≤ ci+1} ∧N,
where l is the number of active players (we use the convention min ∅ = +∞). Moreover,
c2
c1
< AN ≤ 2
c2
c1
. (3.19)
Proof. From (2.2) by the Lagrange duality we get
s∗ = − inf
{
−
N∑
i=1
xi :
N∑
i=1
cixi ≤M, x ≥ 0
}
= − sup
λ≥0
θ(λ),
θ(λ) = inf
x≥0
{
−
N∑
i=1
xi + λ
(
N∑
i=1
cixi −M
)}
= −λM +
N∑
i=1
inf
xi≥0
(λci − 1)xi
=
{
−λM, λ ≥ 1/c1,
−∞, λ < 1/c1.
Thus, s∗ = M/c1. It also follows that x
∗
1 = M/c1, x
∗
i = 0, i ≥ 2 is an optimal solution of
(2.2). In other words, it is optimal to transfer total reward to an agent with the minimal
marginal production cost c1.
Putting σi = xi/s, rewrite the equations (2.7) – (2.9), determining the equilibrium of the
proportional compensation scheme, as follows:
M
ci
(1− σi) = s, s <
M
ci
, (3.20)
xi = 0, s ≥
M
ci
,
N∑
i=1
σi = 1, σi ≥ 0, s > 0. (3.21)
Denote by l the number of active players. Then
l = max{i : s < M/ci}, s < M/cl, s ≥M/cl+1. (3.22)
Using the equality (3.21), from (3.20) we get
s =M
l − 1∑l
i=1 ci
. (3.23)
As we know, there are at least two active players. Thus, from (3.22), (3.23) we conclude
that l can be expressed as follows
l = min
{
i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1} :
i− 1∑i
k=1 ck
≥
1
ci+1
}
∧N.
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This formula gives (3.18):
AN =
s∗
s
=
1
l − 1
l∑
i=1
ci
c1
.
The inequalities of the form (3.19) are presented in [32, Corollaries 4.21, 4.22]. The left
inequality (3.19) is implied by (3.22): s < M/cl ≤M/c2. From (3.20) it follows that σ2 ≤ σ1.
Hence, σ2 ≤ 1/2 and
s =
M
c2
(1− σ2) ≥
M
2c2
.
This gives the right inequality (3.19). 
One more estimate
AN ≤
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
ci
c1
, N ≥ 2 (3.24)
is obtained as follows. For l = N this estimate turns into the equality. Furthermore, if
2 ≤ l < N , then 1
l−1
∑l
k=1 ck ≤ cl+1, and (3.24) is implied by the inequality
1
N − 1
N∑
k=1
ck =
1
N − 1
l∑
k=1
ck +
1
N − 1
N∑
k=l+1
ck ≥
1
N − 1
l∑
k=1
ck +
N − l
N − 1
cl+1
≥
1
N − 1
l∑
k=1
ck +
N − l
N − 1
1
l − 1
l∑
k=1
ck =
1
l − 1
l∑
k=1
ck.
To obtain a meaningful asymptotic result, let us assume, as in Remark 5, that ci are i.i.d.
random variables and ci ≥ c > 0. Then, by the strong law of large numbers, from (3.24) it
follows that
lim
N→∞
AN ≤
ν
c
a.s.,
where ν = Eci. However, our numerical experiments suggest a much better result.
Conjecture 1. Assume that ϕi(x) = cix, where ci are i.i.d. random variables such that
ci ≥ c > 0. Then
lim
N→∞
AN = 1 a.s.
Denote by c
(N)
k the k-th order statistics of the sequence (ci)
N
i=1. That is, c
(N)
k is a k-th
smallest element of the sequence (ci)
N
i=1:
c
(N)
1 ≤ · · · ≤ c
(N)
N , c
(N)
1 = min{c1, . . . , cN}, . . . , c
(N)
N = max{c1, . . . , cN}.
From (3.22) it follows that
AN =
s∗
s
≤
c
(N)
l+1
c
(N)
1
.
To prove the Conjecture 1 it would be enough to show that c
(N)
l+1/c
N
1 → 1 a.s., where
l = min
{
i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1} :
1
i− 1
i∑
k=1
c
(N)
k ≤ c
(N)
i+1
}
∧N.
But this is not an easy task.
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Table 1. Sampled values of AN − 1 for ci = 1 + ξi, where the distributions
i.i.d. random variables ξi are indicated in the first row.
N U(1, 2) U(1, 10) LN(0, 1) LN(0, 2) Pa(0.5, 1) Pa(3, 1)
102 1.3 · 10−1 5.2 · 10−1 2.6 · 10−1 1.1 · 10−1 2.4 · 10−1 9.4 · 10−2
103 4.3 · 10−2 1.4 · 10−1 9.6 · 10−2 4.1 · 10−2 5.0 · 10−2 2.7 · 10−2
104 1.4 · 10−2 5.1 · 10−2 5.0 · 10−2 1.4 · 10−2 2.0 · 10−2 8.3 · 10−3
105 4.3 · 10−3 1.4 · 10−2 3.5 · 10−2 5.3 · 10−3 6.5 · 10−3 2.5 · 10−3
106 1.4 · 10−3 4.3 · 10−3 2.2 · 10−2 2.2 · 10−3 2.0 · 10−3 8.3 · 10−4
107 4.4 · 10−4 1.3 · 10−3 1.2 · 10−2 1.0 · 10−3 6.3 · 10−4 2.6 · 10−4
108 1.4 · 10−4 4.2 · 10−4 9.3 · 10−3 4.7 · 10−4 2.0 · 10−4 8.1 · 10−5
Table 2. Sampled values of the proportion l/N of active players for ci = 1+ξi,
where the distributions i.i.d. random variables ξi are indicated in the first row.
N U(1, 2) U(1, 10) LN(0, 1) LN(0, 2) Pa(0.5, 1) Pa(3, 1)
102 1.7 · 10−1 5.0 · 10−2 1.1 · 10−1 2.3 · 10−1 8.0 · 10−2 2.2 · 10−1
103 4.4 · 10−2 1.7 · 10−2 3.0 · 10−2 4.6 · 10−2 3.6 · 10−2 6.8 · 10−2
104 1.4 · 10−2 4.3 · 10−3 6.4 · 10−3 1.7 · 10−2 1.0 · 10−2 2.3 · 10−2
105 4.7 · 10−3 1.5 · 10−3 1.0 · 10−3 4.5 · 10−3 3.1 · 10−3 7.9 · 10−3
106 1.4 · 10−3 4.8 · 10−4 1.9 · 10−4 1.2 · 10−3 9.8 · 10−4 2.5 · 10−3
107 4.5 · 10−4 1.5 · 10−4 3.2 · 10−5 2.8 · 10−4 3.2 · 10−4 7.7 · 10−4
108 1.4 · 10−4 4.7 · 10−5 5.0 · 10−6 6.5 · 10−5 1.0 · 10−4 2.5 · 10−4
The numerical experiments (implemented by the means of the R software), supporting this
conjecture, are presented in Table 1. As usual, by U(a, b) we denote the uniform distribution
on (a, b). We write ξ ∼ LN(µ, σ2), if ξ = eµ+ση, where η is a standard normal random
variable. The density of the Pareto distribution Pa(α, λ) is given by the formula
f(x) =
αλα
(λ+ x)α+1
, x > 0.
Note that neither a heavy tail nor the infinite expectation (for α = 0.5) of the Pareto
distribution prevent the convergence AN → 1, N →∞.
Table 2 indicates that under the assumptions of Conjecture 1 the proportion of active
players l/N tends to zero.
Remark 6. Concluding the paper, we recall a popular concept of no-regret learning, ex-
plaining the emergence of an equilibrium in a repeated game. Consider a game with the
payoff functions ui(x1, . . . , xN), i = 1, . . . , N , defined on S1 × · · · × SN , and assume that an
agent i knows only his own payoff ui and picks his strategy x
t
i ∈ Si according to a no-regret
algorithm, ensuring that
max
y∈Si
T∑
t=1
ui(y, x
t
−i)−
T∑
t=1
ui(x
t
i, x
t
−i) = o(T ), T →∞, (3.25)
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where xt−i = (x
t
k)k 6=i. Under appropriate assumptions, a plenty of such algorithms is provided
by the theory of online convex optimization: see, e.g., [16].
In [13] for the class of socially concave games it was proved that the average strategy vector
1
T
∑T
t=1 x
t converges to a Nash equilibrium, if xt satisfies the no-regret property (3.25). The
proportional compensation scheme is a socially concave game under a technical assumption
xi ∈ Si = [bmin, bmax] ⊂ (0,∞): see [13, Lemma 5.4]. Thus, at least a positive Nash
equilibrium is approximated by a no-regret dynamics.
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